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CHANGING NATURAL RESOURCE
PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW

The decision to hold a symposium on property rights and natural
resources was based on the opinion by several members of the North
Central Research Strategy Committee* that property rights deserve a
more important place in the social science literature dealing with
natural resources. Property rights, after all, determine who can buy
and sell in the markets and who are the actors in the play which plots
the allocation of natural resources and the distribution of gains and
losses. Minor changes in the property rights system deserve analysis,
as do proposals for new approaches which would result in major
changes in the system.
Property rights are often viewed as a purely legal matter. This is
true in the sense that lawyers are the engineers of the law on property rights. But the resulting system is the concern of all social
scientists, just as newly engineered technological advances ultimately
affect scientists in a variety of disciplines. In fact, both property
rights and technology are too important to be made the sole concern
of the engineers.
The lack of input by all social scientists into property rights
decisions is not caused by exclusion by the lawyer. Social scientists,
particularly economists, have devoted too much time to the suggestions of solutions to problems based on the existing property
rights system. Even though economists have allowed for adjustment
due to shifts in technology, they have not often estimated the productivity of institutional change, except in historical perspective,
analyzing major shifts in social systems. The system of property
rights should be removed from the constraint set, and added to the
list of parameters under analysis.
Property rights represent an institution, and changes therein
involve institutional changes. How are these changes different from
changes in the law? The answer lies in the definition of a social
*The symposium was supported by the Farm Foundation and the Agricultural Experiment Stations in the North Central Region through activities of the North Central Research
Strategy Committee on Natural Resources. The symposium was organized by Wesley D.
Seitz, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Associate Director, Institute for
Environmental Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Joseph C. Headley,
Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of Missouri.
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institution. Since the dictionary definition is relatively sterile, we
shall begin with an original definition of a social institution: an established method of doing socially meaningful things that has been
recognized as the basis for social behavior by a majority of the
society. There are two important characteristics of social institutions: (1) they reflect the accepted method of doing things, i.e.,
people are generally aware of the procedures for selling land, hiring
employees, etc., and (2) they have a certain constancy that gives
them a longer life than even the technological practices they govern.
Thus, people are aware of and expect things to be done in certain
ways because of institutions. They provide a basis and procedure for
accomplishing socially meaningful things such as selling goods and
services, providing for a money supply, defining criminal activity and
distributing incomes. Changes in laws are merely one of many means
of modifying social institutions, albeit the most rapid and direct.
In the case of natural resources, the property rights institution
governs how property is created and defined, determines the rates of
use, and establishes the procedure for the transfer of ownership. This
institutional framework serves as the ultimate criterion for the distribution of wealth in natural resources and for the allocation of
natural resources in various alternative employments.
While the institution of property rights in natural resources has
economic implications, it is shaped by and has major influences upon
other social needs not directly measurable by the institutionally
established economic parameters. Therefore, it must be sufficiently
general to adapt to a multitude of detailed changes in social, cultural,
political and technological needs without breaking down. At the
same time it must contain sufficient specificity to support the practical day to day functioning of a society.
When an institution begins to break down, the phenomenon of
institutional failure has occurred and institutional change is needed.
The first problem is to determine when an institution has failed to
perform in accordance with the needs and desires of society. Then
corrective measures can be determined.
A well documented example of institutional failure from economic literature is termed market failure. This refers to the inability
of markets to allocate resources in a manner that satisfactorily accounts for all of the "significant" goods and bads (negative goods).
The result is a less than desirable state of ecomomic efficiency. The
attempts to deal with market failure have been essentially economic
and have been oversimplified and piecemeal, since more economic
aspects are involved than are effectively considered. In addition,
markets are only a subset of the overall institution of property, and,
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while economic utility functions subsume many facets of human
behavior, they are at best only a surrogate for the psychological,
sociological and political needs of people and may in fact only be a
response to existing but less than adequate institutions. Therefore,
the approach to treatment of perceived cases of market failure such
as environmental degradation requires an examination of the set of
institutions that have to do with natural resources in all of the principal dimensions that describe institutions.
The papers in this symposium reinforce the previous conclusion.
Those dealing with resource problems (the first six) provide examples
of perceived failure on the part of natural resources property rights
institutions to provide for the needs of society. In the case of coal
there are conflicts between surface and mineral rights owners (see
Leistritz). Where water is concerned there is the problem of providing for intertemporal and interspatial allocations as well as allocating
between uses at a point in time (see Ditwiler). Land use results in a
number of conflicts indicative of institutional inadequacy in the
form of use conflicts concerning the definition of the public interest
in land as opposed to protection of the owners' rights (see Bosselman). Oceans and ocean fisheries pose problems of establishing
institutions of property where none exist and the changing of others
where both are complicated by the interfacing of national and international politics (see Christy). Finally, or perhaps centrally, is the
commonality of certain resources and the conflicts which result from
the absence of an adequate institutional framework to deal with the
"commons" or common property (see Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop).
The final three papers present the approaches of the various social
science disciplines to natural resources property rights. These papers
suggest the overlapping of the social sciences in explaining the need
for the property rights institutions and in the diagnosis and treatment of institutional failure. The economists' approach is shown to
be fraught with difficulties, especially in attempting to come to grips
with the specification of a social welfare function. Attempts to
overcome this problem have not been fruitful without assuming the
problem away (see Randall).
From the lawyer's view, Carmichael concludes that the fee simple
absolute can be virtually anything, from a bulwark that protects the
individual from the state to a highly modifiable set of rights that can
be substantially diminished for the collective good. Ostrom complements the work of Carmichael by concluding that while all agree
some form of public organization is needed to avoid the overuse of
common resources, there is disagreement about whether hierarchical
organization is the best way to approach this problem or whether the
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more contemporary public goods and fiscal equivalence approaches
are more advantageous.
This conference was held because more than a few social science
researchers in the natural resources and agricultural areas believe
something is amiss in the institutions that guide human activity.
Property rights is one of the most basic of these institutions and to
date most research efforts have assumed these to be a sacred cow.
The papers are not radical and not altogether unifying because a
grand plan for institutional reform is not laid out. But they provide
insight, for thoughtful people were brought together to bring their
own unique experience to bear on a common issue.
W. D. SEITZ, J. C. HEADLEY and THE EDITORS

